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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DOROTHY BEASLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
11383 
Appeal from a decision denying defendant's motion to 
quash the jury panel and her conviction on the charge of 
grand larceny. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant-Appellant was tried and convicted of the 
crime of grand larceny. Defendant's trial and motion challeng-
mg the jury were conducted before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist in the Second Judicial Court. Sentence was imposed 
for a term of not less than one nor more than ten years and the 
defendant-appellant was placed on probation. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant respectfully requests the court to set aside 
her conviction on the grounds that the jury which convicted 
her was improperly selected in violation of Utah statutory en-
actments and the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 5, 1968, Dorothy Beasley, a Negro, was charg 
ed with the crime of grand larceny, 7 6-38-4, U tab Code 
Annotated, 19 53, as amended. Immediately prior to trial, de-
fendant's attorney John Blair Hutchison moved to challenge 
the jury panel on the following grounds: 
1. That there were material departures from the 
forms and statutes prescribed with respect to selecting. 
drawing, and return of the jury panel. 
2. That the forms and statutes prescribed with re-
spect to selecting, drawing, and returning of the jury in 
the state of Utah are unconstitutional. 
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, one of the Judges of 
the District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, deferred 
ruling on defendant's motion until after the case was tried on 
its merits (T.T.l). On April 18, 1968, the defendant was con-
victed of the crime of grand larceny. Sentencing was deferred 
until a hearing could be had and a ruling made on defendant\ 
motion (T.T. 104, 105 ). 
On July 10, 1968, at the hearing on defendant's motion. 
evidence was introduced which established the following facts: 
That the jury commissioners limited jury participation to 
those persons who had actually voted in the last election 
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and who owned real property (H.T. 11, 72); that 60% of 
the names appearing on the 1968 master jury list were 
taken from the 1967 list (H.T. 48, 166); that propor-
tionate representation, on the master jury list, was not 
given to all areas of Weber County as required by statute 
(H.T. 12, 32, 168); and that the Spanish American 
community in Weber County is grossly underrepresented 
on the master jury list (H.T. 28, 37, 107). 
Judge Wahlquist ruled that the irregularities practiced by 
the JUry commissioners of Weber County were not prejudicial, 
ctnd denied defendant's motion. From that ruling and defend-
Jnt's conviction, this appeal was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A METHOD OF SELECTING JURORS WHICH RE-
SULTS lN A JURY WHICH DOES NOT REPRESENT A 
FAIR CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY IS UNCON-
STITUTIONAL, AND CONVICTIONS THEREBY CANNOT 
STAND. 
A. The defendant was guaranteed a right to trial by jury 
under the laws of the state of Utah. Section 77-1-8 of the Utah 
Code Annotated ( 19 53) provides, among other things, that the 
defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right: 
( 6) To have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committeed; ..... . 
In this case the defendant was charged with grand larceny, 
·-mying a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment and a 
\l.OOO fine (U.C.A. 76-36-6, 1953), which gives her the right 
t<J c1 trial by jury under the above section. 
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At this point it should be noted that the United States 
Supreme Court recently held that the right to trial by jury, a1 
guaranteed in criminal cases in the Federal Courts by Article 
Ill of the United States Constitution and the Sixth Amend-
ment, applies through the Fourteenth Amendment to State 
Courts. Oufl~B v. Loajgana, _____ U.S. ____ , 20 L.Ed. 
2d 491, 88 S.Ct. ___ (1968). The Court limited the 6th 
Amendment's application to crimes of a serious nature and 
held that a crime with a possible penalty of two years in prison 
was serious enough to justify application of the Sixth Amend-
ment. 
Based on the holding of the court in Dun~an, supra, it is 
clear that the defendant in the case at bar would be guaranteed 
a right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment. 
B. Inherent in the right to trial by jury in both State and 
Federal Courts is the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross 
section of the community. As early as 1880 the Supreme 
Court held: 
Trial by jury comtemplates a body of peers or equals of 
the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to 
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associate,, 
persons having the same legal status in society as that 
which he holds. ~tr_'!.}-1_9er v. ~~_g_y_irgilli__<!_, 100 U.S. 303. 
25 L.Ed. 664 (1880), 
Again in Wa~ v. Uni!_~U_!_<!_!es, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated: 
Trial by jury necessarily contemplates an impartial jury 
drawn from a cross section of the community, and tl11s 
means that prospective jurors should be selected by court_ 
officials without systematic and intentional exclusion o! 
any economic, social, religious, racial, political or geo-
graphical groups of the community. 356 F.2d 787 (U.S. 
C.A., Dist. of Columbia 1965 ). 
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The courts have uniformly 8aid that inherent in the right 
to trial by jury is the right to be tried by a fair cross section of 
the community. Ih~L v. South~_!!__}>3,.f.ific, 328 U.S. 217, 90 
L.Ed. 1181 ( 1946); Her~_Ddez v. Tex~, 34 7 U.S. 4 7 5, 98 L. 
Ed. 866, 74 S.Ct. 667 (1954); Eu~_Dks v._Staj_~Qf_Louisi~na, 
356 U.S. 584, 2 L.Ed. 2nd 991, 78 S.Ct. 920 (1958); State v. 
f}_Q~, 12 U. 2d 293, 365 P. 2d 798 (1961); Whitu2_ v. 
(;~QT_g0, 385 U.S. 545, 17 L.Ed. 2nd 599 (1967). 
No system of jury selection is constitutional which 
systematically excludes any economic, social, religious, racial, 
political or geographical group in the community. Wo_2ds v. 
Munns, 347 F. 2d 948 (U.S.C.A. 10th Cir. 1965); Ware v. 
lJ.!liteci_~~_l~, supra ( 1965); _Whit_!!~ v. Geo~_,_ supra. 
Subsection 6 of Section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 
( 19 53) guarantees an "impartial" jury. The objective of this 
requirement is to insure the representative nature of the jury 
and to protect against the exclusion of certain groups which 
would prevent the jury lists from being drawn from a cross 
section of the community. The rationale behind requirements 
for properly selecting juries is succinctly stated by Mr. Justice 
Murphy in ~lassor v. United_~tates, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86, 62 S. 
Ct. 457, 472, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942): 
Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in 
harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society 
and a representative government. For it is part of the 
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments 
of public justice that the jury be a body truly represent-
ative of the community. 
Section 77-1-8, supra, uses the same language as that 
found in the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
Both guarantee an "impartial" jury. The term "impartial jury" 
rnt.:ans one selected from a fair cross section of the community. 
Stt~~ld~ v. We~ Virgi_f!!b 100 U.S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1880); 
\Vbit~ v. g~gr~ supra. 
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Both the Federal Constitution and the laws of Utah re 
quire that a jury be chosen from a fair cross section of the 
community to satisfy the due process. Thus, the requirement 
is fundamentally essential to an overall fair trial. Gi~_gll v. 
Wainw~ight, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799 ( 1963); b'lJ!llQJ v. 
tfogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed. 2d 653 ( 1964); Poi.J:i.L~ v. ]'~~a2 , 
380 U.S. 400, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923 (1965). 
C. The method of selection of the jurors for the master 
jury list, together with the results obtained by the selection 
process, must be examined to determine if the jury represents 
a fair cross section of the community. 
Courts have consistently struck down systems which rely 
on segregated tax rolls as a basis for selecting a jury Ji,t. 
~Q!:!:~ v. Alaba_rrl_ll, 294 U.S. 587, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935) 
Arnold_ v. Nou_h_i=~!:._cl_i_r_i~, 376 U.S. 773, 12 L.Ed. 2d 77, 84 
S.Ct. 1032 ( 1964); }Yhit_!!~ v. GeQ~, supra. 
In the Federal Courts, system~ which have excluded wage 
earners or women have been condemned. Thiel v. ~Q_u_thern 
~~lfic, supra, Ballard v. Unit~_Sta~~ 329 U.S. 187, 91 L.Ed. 
181 (1946). 
Any jury system in which it can be shown that persom 
are excluded because of race violates the Fourteenth Amend 
ment. ~_r:_auder v. Weg_'{_i.!:gi~i'!.i supra, Hel'l1~.!!4_~ v. n_:~~i,_. 
supra, Wh_i!us v. GeQT_g@, supra. 
In Labat v. Bennett, 365 F. 2d 698 (U.S.C.A. 5th Cir.I 
(1966), cl1e cour;-hcld~ where jury commissioners excluded 
daily wage earners from jury lists in State Courts, that the ex 
clusion resulted in prejudice to the Negro race, because of the 
disproportionately high number of Negroes in the wage earn in~ 
ranks compared with other races. 
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The Supreme Court has held that one does not have a 
, 1 ~ltt to a representative from each group, which goes to make 
JP the community, on the jury but that any system as it is set 
up or operated should not result in the systematic exclusion of 
)uch a class or group. Swai!l v. hlaJ?i!!!J._;!, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 
82t 1 3 L.Ed. 2d 7 59 ( 1965) 
Whenever it can be shown that a particular group is avail-
"ble for jury service and that no one from that group has been 
chosen for several years to serve on a jury, the Supreme Court 
ha' held that this constitutes a prima facie case of discrimin-
dllon and the burden shifts to the State to justify the exclusion. 
tl_o_l'_f!S v. hEJ?_;!ma, supra, E;:ttton v. Missisgf>Ei, 332 U.S. 463, 
92 L.Ed. 76 (1947), HernaL!_s!_~ v. I~~~' supra. 
It is also important to note that, in those cases upholding 
the use of tax rolls as a basis for drawing jury lists, the courts 
have pointed out the fact that such tax rolls included the names 
1if owners of both real and personal property so as to give the 
1ury commissioners a broad base from which to choose. Bro~_!}. 
1. Allen. 344 U.S. 443, 97 L.Ed. 469, 73 S.Ct. 397 (1952), 
1\c_t1_f[ v. S_~te, 283 P. 2d 856 (Oklahoma) (1955 ), Ro~c_b v. 
Mall_c!_li!!_, 277 Fed. Supp. 54 (U.S.D.C., N.D. Georgia 1967). 
In ~r.9~__!!. supra, the Supreme Court noted that all males 
between the ages of 21 and 50 were required to pay a poll tax, 
dlld that the tax rolls included both property, however modest, 
and polls. The court went on to remark that the name of every 
property owner and every voter was used in selecting the jury 
list. 
In B,g_~_b, supra. the District Court, in upholding a jury 
\election system which relied on the tax rolls as a source of 
names for the jury lists, was careful to point out that the tax 
11,lls contained the names of all owners of real and personal 
prnpcrty. 277 Fed. Supp. 54, 57 (1967). 
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In Acuff v. State, ~lillra, the state statute specificall 1 
provided that the tax rolls contain the names of both real and 
personal property owners. 283 P. 2d 856, 863. 
D. When Juries are unconstitutionally selected, convictions 
handed down by them cannot stand. 
The courts have been uniform in holding that when a jury 
is unconstitutionally selected its verdict cannot stand, nu 
matter how compelling the evidence. Wh_i!us v. Q~()!_g@, supra, 
~!:9-2h v. Betg, 366 F. 2d 1 (U.S.C.A. 5 Cir. 1966 ); &<!_bjno-
wit~ v. Uniteci~l.<JJ~ 366 F. 2d 34 (U.S.C.A., 5 Cir 196(J), 
Avery v. g~Q_~~, 345 U.S. 559, 97 L.Ed. 1244, 73 S.Ct. 891 
(1952): E_<lj!_Q!1 v. Mi~~~£2L 332 U.S. 463, 469, 92 L.Ed. 76 
(1947). 
POINT II 
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS IN WEBER COUNTY 
r-:IA VE DEPRIVED THE JURY SYSTEM OF ITS INTENDED 
BROAD BASE. THE YOUNG, THE POOR, AND THE NON-
PROPER TY OWNER ARE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST 
Section 78-46-17 of the Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) 
reads: 
It shall be the duty of the jury commissioners before 
the 15th day of December after their appointment to 
select from the names of the kg_tl_y_gg_r~Q_fl_tb_~_<!_~~~~ 
m~JlLI_oll of the county for the current year a written 
fist of the names from which the grand and trial jurors 
shall be drawn to serve in the district court of such 
county during the succeeding calendar year. In making 
the selection they shall choose only those who are not 
exempt from jury service, who are in possession of the11 
faculties, who are not infirm or decrepit, who are well 
informed and free from legal exceptions, <!l_l_d_~_f~r_a~ 
12@C t i~_Qk_,_~_b_Q_<!!:S'.__l1_Q!._L_~!!_Q1~Q_9_11 __th~_j\lI.Y.Ji~L o_f__tfil 
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n~~_£.!:_e_s=_~ding_)"_~L· No person shall be selected as a juror 
who is known to them to be interested in or has cause 
pending which may be tried by a jury to be drawn from 
persons so selected, or who, either personally or other-
wise, has solicited his selection as such. (emphasis 
supplied) 
Based on this statute, the requirements for selection for 
the master jury list are that a person be a legal voter and have 
lus ndme appear on the assessment roll of the particular county 
111 which the jury sits. 
A. By limiting the definition of the term "legal voters", 
as used in Section 76-46-17 U.C.A., to those persons who actu-
ally voted in the last general election, the jury commissioners 
violated the plain intent of the statute and deprived the jury 
wstem of its intended broad base. 
The jury commissioners testified that the first prerequisite 
for selection on the master jury list was that one must have 
voted in the last general election (H.T. 72). To so limit eligi-
bility for jury service violates the plain intent of the legis-
lature and deprives the jury system of its intended broad base. 
If the legislature wanted to limit eligibility for jury service to 
'·actual voters", it would have been a simple task for them to 
use that term rather than the term "legal voters". 
The term "legal voters" refers to those who meet the 
5tatutory and constitutional qualifications to vote. It is not 
limited to those who actually vote. (H.T. 72, 288). Opinion 
Q[_JJ~__nt~ti~~ 230 N.E. 2d 801 (Mass.) (1967); Bilek v. 
City_Qf_i=_b~ago, 396 lll. 445, 71 N.E. 2d 789 (1947); 
Wniht v. Lee, 125 N.J.L. 256, 15 A. 2d 610 (1940); ~~te v. 
Bil\_1!~, 63 Or 277, 127 P. 686 ( 1912); Woodward v. Barker, 
)9 Or 70,] 16 P.101 (1911). lnQJ2i.!1i@-91JJ.!~ fusti~J>, supra, 
the rourt gave the following definition of "legal voters": 
Persons who possess the constitutional qualifications to 
be voters, and who have complied with statutory require-
ments so that they may lawfully cast votes at an election. 
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Evidence at the hearing on defendant's motion to (jU<isJ1 
the jury panel showed that those who voted in the last gen-
eral election were primarily the older members of the com-
munity (H. T. 198, 221 ), and that fewer of the young and of 
the minority groups actually vote in off presidential yeJr; 
although many are registered (H. T. 152, 158, 159). By limit 
ing eligibility for jury service to those who actually voted_ 
the jury commissioners violated the statutory mandate and 
discriminated against the young, the poor, and the mino1 iry 
groups in the community. Thus, the jury commissioners have 
prevented the jury from being drawn from a fair cross section 
of the community, as contemplated by the legislature. 
B. By limiting jury participation to those persons whose 
names appear on the Real Property Index, the commissiunrn 
have unlawfully narrowed the statutory language and thereby 
excluded a large segment of the community from jury servict;. 
The pertinent part of Section 78-46-17 U.C.A. (195J 
provides that prospective jurors are to be selected from: 
.. legal voters on the assessment roll ... " 
1. The term "assessment roll", as used in the above 
statute, includes much more than just the real pro-
perty part of the assessment roll. 
Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitu 
tion provides for the taxation, i.e., assessment, of all 
tangible property in the state of Utah not exempt 
under the laws of Utah or under Federal law. The 
section goes on to exempt from taxation propert\ 
owned by government units, property used for reli 
gious or charitable purposes, and certain propcrt\ 
of irrigation and power transmission facilities. lr 
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further provides that the legislature may abate the 
taxes of the poor, and provides for the exemption 
of homesteads and other personal property. For the 
extent to which the legislature has provided for such 
exemptions, see Volume 6, Chapter 2, of U.C.A. as 
amended (1953). Thus, it is clear that taxable tan-
gible property includes all real and personal prop-
erty. 
Article XIII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitu-
tion provides for the assessment of tangible taxable 
property. Section 59-5-4 of the Utah Code Annot-
ated ( 19 53) enumerates the duties of the county 
assessor in assessing such property, as follows: 
The county assessor must, before the 15th day 
of April of each year, ascertain the names of 
all taxable inhabitants and all property in the 
county subject to taxation except such as is 
required to be assessed by the State Tax Com-
mission and must assess such property to the 
person by whom it was owned or claimed or 
in whose possession or control it was, at 12: 00 
o'clock noon of January next preceding ... " 
Property which is required to be assessed by the 
State is listed in Section 59-5-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953). It states: 
Pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and 
irrigation works, bridges and ferries, and the 
property of car and transportation companies, 
when they are operated as a unit in more than 
one county; all property of public utilities 
whether operated within one county or more; 
all mines and mining claims ... , and all other 
mines and mining claims ... , and all other 
mines and mining claims and other valuable 
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deposits ... , all machinery used in mining and 
all property or surface improvements upon ur 
appurtenant to mines or mining claims ... : 
must be assessed by the state tax commission 
as hereafter provided. All taxable property not 
required by the constitution or by law to be 
assessed by the state tax commission must be 
assessed by the county assessor of the several 
counties in which the same is situated ... 
Utah law further provides that the county assessor 
shall assess real and personal property in the county 
which is not assessed by the state tax commission 
or exempted by the Utah Constitution, and !_9_de-
liver a roll of such assessment tQ the count_)'._JI_e~~ 
urer each~G_ U.C.A. 59-5-30 (1953) 
It follows that an "assessment roll" as con-
templated in the jury selection statute is not limited 
to real property, but would also include personal 
property, such as, automobiles, boats, house trailer>. 
and various types of equipment used by persons in 
business for themselves. 
2. By using only the real property part of the assess-
ment rolls in drawing the master jury list, the com-
missioners have discriminated against the young, 
the poor, and other non-real-property owners in the 
community. 
Bruce Jenkins, Weber County Assessor, testified 
that all property both real and personal, not ex-
empt under State law, was assessed and recorded on 
rolls ( H. T. 16). He further testified that the assess-
ment roll was divided into two parts, one for real 
property and one for personal property ( H. T. 231 ). 
and that the complete assessment roll, listing both 
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real and personal property, was available to the jury 
commissioners if they wi:>hed to use it (H. T. 11, 
27). The effective result of this practice is that all 
non-real-property owners are automatically exclud-
ed from jury service by administrative fiat of the 
Jury comm1ss1oners. 
Every single name found on the master jury lists for 
the years of 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968, a total of 
8,605 names, also appeared on the real property in-
dex for that same period (H. T. 160). Thus, by al-
lowing only real property owners to serve on juries 
you are taking the oldest and more affluent mem-
bers of society who are buying houses by lease, 
deed, mortgage transaction, ... and are excluding 
the escrow purchasers, the young, and other per-
sons (H. T. 190). 
Moreover, the courts have sustained the use of tax 
rolls as a basis for drawing jury lists only when such 
rolls included both real and personal property, so 
as to reflect a cross section of the community. 
Brown v. Allen, supra; Roach v. Maudlin, supr<!_i 
Acuff V. State, supra. 
By limiting jury service to real property owners who 
voted in the last general election, the jury commis-
sioners of Weber County have discriminated against 
the young adult, the poor, and the non-property 
owners. Evidence of this is indicated by the fact 
that of approximately 1,000 people polled, the 
names of whom appeared on the 1968 master jury 
list, only 134 gave their age as being under 40 years 
of age (H. T. 163). This is in light of the fact that 
Mr. Judkins from the Utah State Employment Of-
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fice testified that 25.7% of the total population in 
Weber County consisted of persons between the 
ages of 20 and 39 (H. T. 27). Also, as indicated be-
fore in this brief, all names appearing on the jury 
lists were those of real property owners. 
The jury commissioners in Weber County have 
placed on jury service, restrictions never intended 
by the legislature. As a result, the jury which tried 
the defendant was not drawn from a cross section 
of the community, and her conviction cannot stand. 
C. By copying 60% of the names on the 19 68 master jury list 
from names that appeared on the list from the previous year. 
the commissioners have violated their statutory duty as set 
forth in 78-46-17, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
Section 78-46-17, Utah Code Annotated ( 19 53) provide, 
in part that: 
... in making the selection they [the jury commissioners I 
shall choose only those who are not exempt from jury 
service, who are in possession of their faculties, who are 
well informed and free from legal exceptions, and, as far 
as practicable, who are not returned on the jury of the 
next preceding year. 
Evidence at the hearing established that over 60% of the 
names listed on the master jury list for 1968 were carried 
over from the 1967 list (H. T. 166), and, in fact, the com-
missioners testified that they merely replaced the names of 
persons who had been called for service in the preceding year 
(H. T. 48). 
The statute above cited places a duty on the commis-
sioners to refrain, as far as practicable, from placing the same 
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11 a111es on the current master jury list which appeared on the 
list of the previous year. The objective of this requirement is 
to provide as large a segment of the citizenry as possible with 
rhe opportunity of jury service; and, while the statute does 
~;ant some flexibility to the jury commissioners, this does not 
;ncan that they may use it to defeat the purpose of the pro-
.,·11ion. The term "as far as practicable", as used in the statute, 
ivhc11 read in the context in which it appears, requires that the 
1
ury commissioners refrain from using the same names year 
Jftcr year. Moreover, there is no right given to copy names 
directly from the previous year's master jury list. To allow 
this practice would be to "lock in" certain individuals and 
lilllit the chance of others in the community to sit on juries. 
As the Supreme Court states in Gia~~_!:_ v. Uni!_~States, 
'upra. 
Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection 
uf jurors by any method other than a process which will 
insure a trial by a representative group are undermining 
processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and 
~hould be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing 
such tendencies may be the best must not blind us to the 
clangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on 
this essentjal right. Steps innocently taken may one by 
one lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial 
liberties. 
Thus, when 60% of the names on the 1968 master jury 
li1t were copied from the 1967 list, the list was compiled in 
violation of the statutory requirement and is unconstitutional. 
0 The jury commissioners unlawfully disregarded legis-
l1tive mandate designed to insure that each geographical area 
rl the community be represented on the jury lists, and there-
by rendered jury lists so drawn unconstitutional and in viola-
tion of Section 78-46-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
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Section 78-46-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953), in re-
ferring to the manner of choosing names for jury lists, pro-
vides, in part: 
Names shall be selected as far as practicable from the 
several precincts of the county in proportion to the num-
ber of votes cast therein. 
The obvious object of the legislature in drafting this sec-
tion was to insure that each geographical area would be repre-
sented on the master jury list, thereby insuring that any jury 
chosen would be chosen from a list representative of the com-
munity as a whole. 
The author asserts that the term "precinct" used in 
the above statute is synonymous with "voting district". Sec-
tion 20-3-2( d), Utah Code Annotated ( 19 53), in dealing with 
definitions concerning primary elections defines the term pre-
cinct as one or more voting districts, while Section 1 7-16-5. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines precinct as a unit of 
government. In light of such diversity of meaning the term 
should be given the meaning its' context most suggests. The 
context in which the term appears indicates that the legisla-
ture intended that it should act as an insurance that each area 
of the community would be represented on the master jury 
list, and with this in mind it is important to note that a pre-
cinct, as a unit of government, no longer exists in Weber 
County, Therefore, to require that each precinct be propor-
tionately represented would be form without substance. To 
assume that each city constitutes a precinct would be to de-
feat the objective of the provision, in that the proportionate 
number of jurors could be chosen from a city and still deny 
representation to any geographical area in the city. The above 
analysis indicates that the only definition which could be giv-
en to the term "precinct" which would be in line with the ob-
jective of this provision would be that of "voting district." 
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That the jury commissioners in Weber County failed to 
comply with the provisions of this section is shown by the 
Lid that voting districts 58, 59, and 60 in Ogden City had no 
representative on the master jury list although they cast .4, .3, 
Jnd .4 per cent of the total vote in Weber County, respectively 
H. T. )2, 168). Moreover, there were persons in those dis-
tricts ljUalified for jury service (H. T. 12). By way of contrast 
die rown of Hooper, which cast only 1.3% of the total vote 
(H. T. 32), had 41 persons represented on the list (H. T. 168). 
According to statutory requirement, Hooper should be re-
presented by no more than 30 persons on the master jury list; 
and districts 58, 59, and 60 should have 9, 7, and 9 represent-
atives on the master jury list, respectively. 
The term "as far as practicable" as used in the statute 
allows the commissioners to equate as near as practicable the 
percentage of representation on the jury list with the percent-
age of the total vote cast by a particular district in the last 
election. It in no way gives the commissioners the power to 
vrbitrarily exclude one district and grossly over represent an-
other. Thus, the jury commissioners in Weber County went 
beyond the limited discretion allowed them by statute and 
prevented the master jury list from representing a fair cross 
1cct1on of the community as contemplated by the legislature. 
POINT Ill 
THE JURY COMMISSIONERS HAVE DISCRIMINAT-
ED ACAINST PERSONS OF SPANISH AMERICAN ORIGIN 
IN ORA WING JURY LISTS, AND THEREFORE JURIES 
DRAWN THEREFROM ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
CONVICTIONS BY THEM CANNOT ST AND. 
!\ The courts have consistently held that any system which 
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excludes a particular class of persons on the basis of race 
from jury service, violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
constitution of the United States. 
Since 1880 the courts of this country have held that any 
system which operates so as to exclude persons from jury se; 
vice on the basis of race is unconstitutional. Str~l!_d~_r_ v. \Y_t:~t 
Y!rg!Dg, supra; Akins v. Te~_2, 325 U.S. 398, 65 S. Ct. 1276. 
89 L.Ed. 1695, (1945); Cassell v. Tex~, 339 U.S. 282, 7(1 
S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950); Whitu~ v. g~Q_I];@, supra. 
Although these cases speak in terms of "purpose to dis-
criminate", and "intentional discrimination", they also recog-
nize a positive, affirmative duty on the part of the jury com-
missioners and other state officials not to discriminate, and 
indicate that it is not necessary to go so far as to establish ill 
will, evil motive, or absence of good faith, but that objective 
results are largely to be relied on in application of the Consti-
tutional test. 
B. People of Spanish American ancestry constitute a class 
within the community and are being unconstitutionally ex-
cluded from jury service. 
The Supreme Court has indicated that the essential mat-
ters to be considered in determining if a systematic exclusion 
of a certain class of jurors exists are: 
That the class claimed to be excluded forms a substanti.~ 
segment of the population of the county, that some of 
the class are qualified to serve as jurors, and that a mere 
token or no members of the class have served on juries 
over an extended period of time. Norr~ v. Ahi.l>~Ql~. 29..\ 
U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935), E_<!_!:!_L!~ 
v. Mis~_s_?_ip_pj_, 332 U.S. 463, 92 L.Ed. (1947). 
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l. People of Spanish American ancestry constitute a 
separate class. 
Statistics indicate that 10% of the population 
of Ogden City have Spanish American surnames and 
that about 5% of the population of Weber County 
1s of Spanish American ancestry (H.T. 37, 28). 
Courts have held under similar circumstances 
that persons of Spanish American ancestry consti-
tuted a separate class within the community, the ex-
clusion of which from jury service would render 
such juries unconstitutional. Hernandez v. Texas, 
supra; Montoya v. People, 14 Colo. 2d 9, 345 P. 2d 
1062 (1959). 
2. There is a substantial number of persons of Spanish 
American ancestry who are qualified to appear on 
jury lists and act as jurors. 
Section 78-46-17 of the Utah Code Annotated 
indicates that the jury lists are to be drawn from the 
legal voters on the assessment rolls. 
Testimony at the hearing established that there 
were 1,329 registered voters with Spanish American 
surnames (H.T. 158) and that 364 persons on the 
real property assessment rolls had surnames of 
Spanish American origin (H.T. 95). 
3. Mere token inclusion of persons of Spanish Amer-
ican ancestry renders the 1968 jury list unconstit-
utional. 
The courts have indicated that token summon-
ing of a particular race or class would not meet 
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constitutional requiremt>nts. Brow_D v. Allen, supra; 
Akins v. Te~~ supra; MontoE v. PeQ.E.l_~ supra. 
In Montoya, supra, the court held, when no 
person with a Spanish-sounding surname had ser-
ved on a jury for several years, and when only 2 
names on a jury list of 1600 had Spanish-sounding 
surnames in a community of 17,000, 719 of which 
had Spanish-sounding surnames, that this constituted 
a prima facie case of discrimination, and ruled that 
the jury which convicted the defendant was uncon-
stitutionally selected and that the conviction could 
not stand. 
It is important to note that the courts have 
consistently struck down systems which used, as a 
basis for drawing jury lists, sources which had per-
sons classified according to race. Norris v. Ala_Q~~ 
supra; Arnold v. North ~rolinil, supra; Whi!_us v. 
Georgia, supra. 
By analogy, just as a person of a different race 
is distinquished by color, these Spanish names pro-
vide ready identification of the members of this 
class. In selecting jurors, the jury commissioners 
work from a list of names and, while one cannot 
change the names, the courts should take extra pre-
cautions to insure that such names are not used as 
a basis to discriminate either intentionally or unin-
tentionally. 
Out of 2318 names on the 1968 jury list, 
approximately 14 are names of persons of the Negro 
race (H.T.125). This is in light of the fact that only 
about 2% of the population of Weber County is of 
that race, and only about 2Y2 per cent of the popu-
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lation of Ogden City is of that race (H.T. 28,37). 
In contrast, only six persons with Spanish American 
sounding surnames appeared on the 1968 jury list 
( H. T. 107) despite the fact that it is estimated that 
10% of the residents of Ogden City have Spanish-
sounding surnames and that approximately 5% of 
the population of Weber County is of Spanish 
American ancestry. 
The defendant asserts that, in light of the above 
analysis, persons of Spanish American ancestry are 
being discriminated against in the drawing of jury 
lists in Weber County, thus rendering any jury 
selected unconstitutional. As a result, any con-
viction handed down by such a jury cannot stand. 
POINT IV 
WHEN A JURY IS NOT DRAWN FROM A FAIR 
CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY, PREJUDICE TO 
THE DEFENDANT IS ASSUMED AND HIS CONVICTION 
CANNOT ST AND REGARDLESS OF THE RACE OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
A. The defendant in the case at bar, a Negro, was prejudiced 
by the method of jury selection in Weber County, and her 
conviction must be set aside. 
The courts have held that any jury selection system 
wli1ch results in juries which are not drawn from a fair cross 
section of the community infringe upon the defendant's con-
>titutional right of trial by jury, and that convictions by such 
juries cannot stand. Passer v. CoUI!,t}'. Board, 171 Minn. 177, 
'11 N.W. 545 (1927); Walter v. Stat~ 208 Ind. 231, 195 
NE. 268 (1935); Unit~il._States v. Greenh_qg, 200 Fed. Supp. 
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382 (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., 1961); Rabinowitz v. \Lf!i.t_e_Q_St~~ 1, 
supra. 
In Passer, supra, the defendant, a man, challenged the 
jury on the basis that women were unconstitutionally exclud 
ed from jury service. The court in commenting on the right to 
a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community stated 
that: 
When a jury is not chosen from a fair cross section of 
the community, this right may not be legally denied, 
and if it is denied we must presume that the defendant 
was prejudiced thereby. 19 5 N .E. 271. 
In Gree!!_berg, supra, the court stated: 
The defendant here does not claim that any actual or 
specific prejudice to him has resulted or will result from 
the methods of selection which he attacks. But his right 
to relief is not dependent upon the showing of prejudice 
in his individual case. If as he claims, the list from which 
his grand jury was drawn was made up in violation of 
prescribed and accepted standards, then that in itself 
would entitle him to relief. 200 Fed. Supp. 387. 
The court went on in the same case to explain that ex-
clusion of a racial group or economic or social class from jury 
service deprived the jury system of the broad base that it was 
designed to have in our democratic society and that such act-
ion operated to destroy the basic democratic nature and class-
lessness of jury personnel. The court further pointed out that 
under such a system injury is not limited to the defendant but 
that there was injury to the jury system, to the law as an in-
stitution, to the community at large, and to the democratic 
ideal reflected in the processes of our courts. 
The 5th Circuit applied the same reasoning as the Green 
berg court in Rabinowit~ v. United Sta~ supra, in which thr 
defendant, a white girl, challenged the jury system on the 
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ciuL1nds the Negroes were excluded. The court upheld the 
challenge and held: 
Departure from statutory scheme depriving a jury system 
nf the broad base it was designed by Congress to have 
may be asserted by any litigant, even though he is not a 
member of the excluded class. 366 F.2d 37. 
See also United_~ates v. Denn_is, 183 F. 2d 201 (U.S.C.A. 
~11d Cir. 1950), in which Judge Learned Hand, in commenting 
0 11 rhe right of the defendant to challenge a jury on the basis 
rlur it was not drawn from a fair cross section of the commun-
ity, stated: 
That any party to a suit, civil or criminal, is entitled to 
have the particular panel which tries his case, drawn at 
random from a list which is not unlawfully weighted, and 
that he may complain even though he has not shown that 
the imbalance has prejudiced him. 183 F. 2d 216. 
The defendant in the case at bar was guaranteed a right 
ru trial by jury by Section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 
1953). Such a right comtemplates trial by a jury drawn from 
" tau cross section of the community. 
The jury commissioners have deprived the defendant of 
!1u constitutional rights by drawing jury lists exclusively from 
"ilters whose names appear on the real property index and by 
,Jiscriminating against persons of Spanish American ancestry. 
!he result is that the constitutional rights of the defendant 
have been prejudiced and her conviction cannot stand. 
!l. The prosecution in the case at bar must show beyond 
<1 reasonable doubt that the prejudice to the defendant was 
11,irmlc,~. 
In 1961 the Supreme Court of Utah held that to require 
1111urs to take a test to qualify as jurors was error, but that 
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such error was harmless and therefore did not require a re 
versal. ~ate v. Do~, supra. However, the court pointed out 
that the result would have been different had the defendant 
shown that such a requirement resulted in a jury which wa, 
not drawn from a cross section of the community. 
In the case at bar the defendant has shown that the jury 
system as it operates in Weber County results in a jury which 
1s not drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 
Recently the United States Supreme Court in two differ-
ent cases has indicated what test is to be applied in determin-
ing if the denial of a constitutional right constitutes harmless 
error. Fai}y v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed. 2d 171, 84 
S.Ct. 229 (1963); Chap_man v. QilifQTBg, 386 U.S. 18, 17 
L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1966). 
In Fahy, supra the court stated that the test was: 
... whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of may have contributed to the 
conviction. 375 U.S. 86-87. 
Subsequently, in Ch'!J'_!!lan. supra, the court clarified its 
holding in F ah_y, stating: 
That before a constitutional error can be held harmless. 
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. 25, 17 L.Ed. 
2d 710. 
The defendant in the case at bar was guaranteed a trial 
by a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 
and the question of whether the denial of this right was harm-
less error would have to be decided according to the test laid 
down above by the Supreme Court. The burden is on the pros-
ecution to show that prejudice to the defendant in the case at 
bar was harmless. Ch~_ill_an v. <:-:_~ifo_Qlia, supra. The defendant 
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,1,•.crt> that the prosecution did not and can not sustain this 
hl;' den and that her conviction must be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
By limiting the jury selection process to those persons 
1 .. 1i 0 own real property and who voted in the last general 
election, the jury commissioners have discriminated against 
rlic poor, the minority groups, and those other qualified 
pmons who did not exercise their franchise in the last general 
election. Consequently, the jury which tried Dorothy Beasley 
w.ls not drawn from a fair cross section of the community, 
and prejudice to her is assumed. Her conviction must be set 
Jjde. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
Weber County Bar Legal Services 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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Ogden, Utah 84401 
25 
